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Abstract
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Policy Research Working Paper 5050
As the economic crisis deepens and widens, fears of a 
return to the protectionist spiral of the 1930s become 
more common. However, an important difference 
between the 1930s and today is the existence of the 
World Trade Organization and the legal limits it imposes 
on the protectionist responses members can pursue. 
The objective of this paper is threefold. First, to assess 
the extent to which applied tariff can legally be raised 
without violating tariff-bound obligations, and compare 
it with what is economically possible. Second, to examine 
This paper—a product of the  International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network 
and the DFID supported Global Trade and Financial Architecture project—is part of an effort to monitor trade-related 
policy responses to the crisis. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The authors may be contacted at liliana.foletti@unctad.org, fugazza @unctad.org, alessandro.nictia @unctad.org, and 
marcelo.olarreaga@unige.ch
what has been the protectionist response of individual 
countries when facing an economic crisis since the 
creation of the WTO. Finally, to predict how far the 
protectionist responses will go during the current crisis. 
Results suggest that the policy space left when looking 
at what is economically possible is indeed quite large. 
However, in the recent past very little of the available 
policy space has been used by countries suffering from an 
economic crisis. Our predictions for the current crisis are 
modest tariff hikes in the order of 8 percent.  
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1. Introduction 
During the great depression protectionism spread rapidly. By 1933 world trade was only 
a third of what it was in 1929. Part of this slump had to do with the decline in economic 
activity, but several studies estimate the contribution of protectionist forces somewhere 
between 25 to 50 percent of the total decline in world trade.
1 The protectionist response 
started in the United States with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act passed in June 1930, 
which raised tariffs by 23 percent according to Irwin (1998). Many countries retaliate. 
According to Masden (2001), the world average effective tariff (the ratio of the value of 
import duties and import value) increased from 9 percent in 1929 to 20 percent by 1933, 
with values as high as 30 percent in Germany and the UK.   
Several authors have warned of a similar –albeit more timid- trend developing as 
the current crisis deepens (Baldwin and Evenett, 2008 or 2009 and Gamberoni and 
Newfarmer 2009). Moreover, as suggested by Baldwin and Evenett, 2009, this time 
protectionism may be taking murkier forms making monitoring more difficult. An 
important difference between what happened during the great depression and today, is the 
presence of a World Trade Organization that imposes some limits to the protectionist 
response.
2 One may argue that the WTO has been weakened by its failure to conclude the 
Doha Round it started in November 2001. However, in 1930 the only international 
commitment to which 1028 US based economists could refer to when asking president 
Hoover to veto the Smoot-Hawley Act was a 1927 League of Nations resolution 
announcing that “the time has come to put an end to an increase in tariffs and to move in 
the opposite direction’’.
3   
The objective of this paper is threefold. First, we want to assess the extent to 
which countries can respond to the crisis by increasing their tariffs without violating their 
WTO obligations. Second, to study the tariff response of countries which have been 
                                                 
1
 Irwin (1998) suggests that a quarter of the decline in US trade may be due to tariff increases associated 
with the Smooth-Hawley Act (part of effective increase was due to declining prices associated with the 
depression in the presence of specific tariffs), whereas Masden (2001) attributes half of the decline to 
increases in tariff and non-tariff barriers.    
2
 Bacchetta and Piermartini (2009) focus on the value of WTO’s tariff bindings. 
3
See article on page 1 of the  New York Times, May 5
th 1930 : “1,028 Economists ask Hoover to Veto 
Pending Tariff Bill”. 3 
 
subject to economic crisis in the recent past, and finally to provide estimates of the tariff 
hikes we can expect in the current crisis.   
 
2. Tariff water, smoke and deeper waters 
The GATT and the Agricultural Agreement of the Uruguay Round impose a legal limit to 
the extent of tariff hikes by WTO members. This legal limit is called a bound tariff and is 
what is actually negotiated in the WTO.
4 The difference between the bound and the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) applied tariff, measures in principle the degree of flexibility 
available to each country within its WTO obligations. It is called tariff overhang or more 
commonly tariff water.
5  
Tariff water is generally low in OECD’s manufacturing sector but can reach very 
high levels in some emerging economies, or in agriculture. In order to assess the 
importance that the protectionist legal response can take in different countries, we 
estimated the average tariff water in each country or region. To do so we follow Kee et 

















    ( 1 )  
 
where Bic is the bound tariff on good i in country c, T is the MFN applied tariff on good i 
in country c, imports is the value of imports on good i in country c and elasticity is the 
absolute value of the import demand elasticity on good i in country c. It is straightforward 
to see that Water is given by the difference between the weighted average bound tariff 
and the MFN applied tariff, where weights are given by the product of import demand 
elasticities and the value of imports.  
                                                 
4
 During the Uruguay Round GATT's members agreeed to bind all tariff lines for agricultural products by 
the end of the negotiations. Moreover, since 1989 all new members to the GATT and then to the WTO 
were required to bind all their tariff lines on accession. This implies that binding coverage can be 
incomplete only for non agricultural products for countries that became members of the GATT before 
1989. 
5
 Recent studies focusing on the extent of tariff water include Archard (2008) or Boüet et Laborde (2008).  4 
 
Table 1: Tariff water (Latest Available Year) 
Country MFN  Bound Water   Country  MFN Bound Water
All  Countries  0.05 0.15 0.11   Lesotho  0.15 0.66  0.50
High Income  0.04  0.11 0.07   Macedonia, FYR  0.06  0.06  0.00
Middle  Income  0.08 0.24 0.16   Madagascar  0.11 0.60  0.49
Low  Income    0.09 0.45 0.36   Malawi  0.33 1.41  1.08
              Malaysia  0.04  0.21  0.17
Antigua and Barbuda  0.14  0.69 0.55   Mali  0.11  0.47  0.36
Argentina  0.08 0.36 0.28   Mauritania  0.10 0.39  0.29
Australia  0.03 0.10 0.07   Mauritius  0.03 0.85  0.81
Bahrain  0.05 0.68 0.63   Mexico  0.13 0.39  0.25
Bangladesh  0.12 0.94 0.81   Mongolia  0.05 0.19  0.14
Barbados  0.19 0.96 0.77   Morocco  0.19 0.43  0.24
Belize  0.08 0.63 0.54   Mozambique  0.08 0.73  0.65
Benin  0.16 0.56 0.40   Myanmar  0.06 0.64  0.58
Bolivia  0.08 0.45 0.36   Namibia  0.09 0.33  0.24
Botswana  0.11 0.23 0.12   Nepal  0.14 0.30  0.16
Brazil  0.11 0.31 0.20   New  Zealand  0.02 0.11  0.09
Brunei  0.10 0.43 0.33   Nicaragua  0.07 0.44  0.37
Burkina  Faso  0.09 0.61 0.52   Niger  0.07 0.49  0.41
Burundi  0.13 1.04 0.91   Nigeria  0.08 0.78  0.70
Cambodia  0.09 0.20 0.10   Norway  0.01 0.11  0.10
Cameroon  0.14 1.07 0.93   Oman  0.05 0.13  0.08
Canada  0.03 0.09 0.06   Pakistan  0.11 0.61  0.50
Central African Rep.  0.14  0.45 0.31   Panama  0.07  0.20  0.14
Chad  0.14 1.09 0.95   Papua  New  Guinea  0.01 0.31  0.30
Chile  0.06 0.30 0.24   Paraguay  0.06 0.38  0.32
China  0.05 0.06 0.00   Peru  0.04 0.36  0.32
Colombia  0.14 0.50 0.36   Philippines  0.05 0.49  0.44
Costa  Rica  0.05 0.40 0.34   Qatar  0.05 0.17  0.12
Cote  d'Ivoire  0.11 0.51 0.40   Rwanda  0.16 0.91  0.75
Croatia  0.05 0.06 0.01   Saudi  Arabia  0.04 0.10  0.06
Dominica  0.12 0.73 0.62   Senegal  0.10 0.29  0.19
Ecuador  0.10 0.25 0.15   Singapore  0.00 0.65  0.65
El Salvador  0.07  0.36 0.29   South Africa  0.07  0.30  0.24
European  Union  0.05 0.08 0.03   Sri  Lanka  0.09 0.67  0.58
Gabon  0.15  0.24 0.09   St. Kitts and Nevis  0.14  0.80  0.66
Georgia  0.01 0.08 0.07   St.  Lucia  0.10 0.87  0.77
Ghana  0.10  1.00 0.90   St. Vincent   0.12  0.77  0.65
Grenada  0.12 0.58 0.46   Swaziland  0.09 0.32  0.23
Guatemala  0.07 0.44 0.37   Taiwan  0.06 0.07  0.01
Guinea  0.13 0.51 0.38   Tanzania  0.11 0.99  0.88
Guyana  0.12 0.60 0.47   Thailand  0.07 0.54  0.47
Honduras  0.08 0.23 0.15   Togo  0.14 1.06  0.92
Iceland  0.02 0.26 0.24   Trinidad  and  Tobago  0.23 0.61  0.38
India  0.10 0.37 0.27   Tunisia  0.20 0.68  0.48
Indonesia  0.06 0.35 0.28   Turkey  0.06 0.48  0.43
Israel  0.04 0.36 0.32   Uganda  0.10 1.02  0.92
Jamaica  0.08 0.55 0.46   United  States  0.03 0.03  0.00
Japan  0.02 0.20 0.18   Uruguay  0.07 0.36  0.29
Jordan  0.09 0.14 0.05   Venezuela  0.14 0.36  0.22
Korea,  Rep.  0.08 0.28 0.20   Zimbabwe  0.10 0.63  0.52
Kyrgyz Republic  0.04  0.08 0.04          
 
Our estimates
6 suggest that world’s tariff water is 11 percent, but is close to zero 
in the US and China, and higher than 70 percent in many least developed countries and 
                                                 
6
 Estimates are computed using observations for the latest available year, which is at best 2008. 5 
 
small island states (see Table 1). There is also quite significant variance across sectors 
with world’s agriculture tariff water at around 27 percent, whereas manufacturing tariff 
water is around 9 percent (see Appendix Table). Higher income levels are usually 
associated with lower MFN tariffs, but also lower levels of tariff water. The average tariff 
water is 7 percent among high income countries, and it doubles for middle income 
countries, and doubles once again for low income countries to reach 36 percent.  
Given that on average world MFN tariffs are at around 5 percent, tariff water 
could potentially allow tariffs to triple without violating GATT’s bound obligations. So 
potentially, we could have a protectionist reaction on tariff lines with positive water that 
is much stronger than the one observed during the great depression in the absence of 
GATT or WTO commitments. Thus, WTO tariff binding commitments would be of little 
value. However, a significant share of the policy space allowed by these high tariff 
bindings is potentially irrelevant as we discuss below. 
 
2.1 Smoke in the water at the other end of Lake Geneva
7 
There are at least two reasons why these numbers may provide an overestimate of the 
extent of flexibility available. First, some of the bound tariffs may be above the 
prohibitive tariffs, and therefore although it is legally possible to increase tariffs above 
their prohibitive levels it would be economically meaningless to do so. We call this 
useless water. Second, an important share of world trade is not subject to MFN tariffs, 
but is regulated by preferential agreements, making tariff bounds less relevant. We call 
this deeper water, as it captures the presence of deeper commitments to lower tariffs 
within preferential trade agreements.  
Thus, there may be a lot of tariff water available, but once we control for useless 
and deeper water, only a fraction offers meaningful policy space. This meaningless policy 
space is what we call smoke. It is given by the sum of useless and deeper water.  
 
All these concepts are formally defined below. Useless water is given by:  
                                                 
7
 The song « Smoke on the water » was written by Deep Purple and refers to the fire that took place at the 
Montreux Casino during Frank Zappa’s concert in the 1971 Festival. Montreux is at the opposite end of 
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where Pic is the prohibitive tariff of good i in country c. Note that useless water is 
bounded between 0 and Water. If useless water=water (i.e. Pic=Tic), then all legal 
flexibility granted by tariff binding is economically meaningless. If useless water=0 (i.e. 
Pic≥Bic), then all legal flexibility is economically meaningful. The share of useless water 
in water determines the extent to which the legal flexibility granted by WTO agreements 
is economically irrelevant. 
A problem with equation (2) is the determination of prohibitive tariffs. To 
calculate them we use a linear approximation around the equilibrium imports in each 
country. Start with the definition of the import demand elasticity, and note that a 
prohibitive tariff implies Δmi=-mi. Then solve for the prohibitive tariff recalling that the 
domestic price is given by    ic
w








           ( 3 )  
 
Thus the prohibitive tariff can be readily calculated using estimates of import 
demand elasticity at the six digit level of the Harmonized System for more than 100 
countries in Kee et al (2008). They are then replaced in (2) to obtain a measure of useless 
water. 
As mentioned earlier, preferential trade also makes bound tariffs, and water less 
relevant. To see this simply note that as MFN tariff increases, preferential trade is 
unaffected. If anything it increases. At the limit, if all trade is preferential, then an 
increase in the MFN applied tariff to the bound or prohibitive level is meaningless.  
We suggest two corrections for this. First, the distribution of preferential imports 
across goods and its correlation with bound, applied and prohibitive tariffs matters. Thus 
the weights used in the weighted average need to take this into account. The idea is that if 
imports of good i are exclusively preferential, then the difference between bounds or 7 
 
prohibitive tariffs on the one hand, and MFN tariffs on the other hand, is irrelevant when 
it comes to measure the extent of flexibility available in the system. It is all deeper water 
that is beyond the legal scope of the WTO. Deeper water is then formally defined as:  
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where 
pref
ic imports  are preferential imports of good i by country c.  
 
Finally, we define smoke as the sum of useless and deeper water:  
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Water _ Deeper Water _ Useless Smoke
       (5) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the concepts we have introduced. Water is given by the 
difference between bound and MFN tariffs. Useless water is given by the share of water 
between the bound and the prohibitive tariff. Deeper water is the share of the remaining 
water that is subject to preferential trade. What is left is called policy space. 
 




Table 2: Share of deeper water, useless water, and smoke in water (Latest Available Year) 
Country Deeper  Useless  Smoke    Country Deeper  Useless  Smoke 
All  countries  11.4 20.0  31.4    Lesotho  1.1 11.0  12.1 
High Income  5.7  22.6  28.2    Macedonia, FYR  2.4  0.0  2.4 
Middle Income  23.9  12.6  36.6    Madagascar  12.2  0.2  12.4 
Low Income   3.1  27.2  30.2    Malawi  40.9  2.3  43.1 
              Malaysia  17.1  16.6  33.6 
Antigua and Barbuda  13.6  7.6  21.3    Mali  6.8  1.1  7.9 
Argentina  21.0 22.8  43.8    Mauritania  0.0 46.7  46.7 
Australia 39.7  21.0  60.8    Mauritius  8.9  4.5  13.4 
Bahrain 7.4  1.1  8.5    Mexico  54.6  14.0  68.6 
Bangladesh 4.9  23.0  27.9    Mongolia  0.0  0.3  0.3 
Barbados  8.7 22.0  30.7    Morocco  34.7 14.8  49.4 
Belize 29.5  4.8  34.2    Mozambique  7.2  23.5  30.7 
Benin 4.9  0.5  5.4    Myanmar 11.3  29.4  40.6 
Bolivia  43.7 6.6  50.2    Namibia  48.5 3.5  52.0 
Botswana  10.3 1.1  11.4    Nepal  6.8 5.3  12.2 
Brazil  16.4 30.5  46.8    New  Zealand  37.3 13.8  51.0 
Brunei  21.8 8.7  30.5    Nicaragua  12.6 7.3  20.0 
Burkina Faso  5.7  3.6  9.3    Niger  2.3  13.4  15.7 
Burundi 46.7  3.2  49.9    Nigeria  0.5  11.8  12.3 
Cambodia  14.0 38.7  52.7    Norway  4.8 64.8  69.5 
Cameroon  4.7 1.4  6.1    Oman  24.5 8.6  33.1 
Canada 17.5  5.3  22.7    Pakistan  2.5  34.9  37.4 
Central African Rep.  0.1  1.3  1.3    Panama  29.2  3.6  32.8 
Chad  0.2  1.2  1.4    Papua New Guinea  0.2  5.3  5.5 
Chile  56.0 7.4  63.4    Paraguay  33.0 2.4  35.4 
China 4.7  0.3  5.0    Peru  18.3  28.0  46.2 
Colombia 18.8  22.0  40.9    Philippines  14.8  1.9  16.7 
Costa Rica  2.1  17.9  20.0    Qatar  14.8  9.7  24.5 
Cote d'Ivoire  1.0  1.0  1.9    Rwanda  14.2  28.9  43.0 
Croatia  24.3 0.2  24.6    Saudi  Arabia  7.2 5.5  12.7 
Cuba 11.2  6.1  17.3    Senegal  0.5  14.7  15.2 
Dominica  36.1 4.8  40.9    Singapore  0.0 4.4  4.4 
Ecuador 21.3  1.2  22.5    South  Africa  8.7  13.6  22.3 
El Salvador  12.1  18.8  30.9    Sri Lanka  14.9  0.5  15.4 
European Union  11.9  41.7  53.6    St. Kitts and Nevis  12.5  5.6  18.1 
Gabon 3.9  5.9  9.9    St.  Lucia  26.3  22.2  48.5 
Georgia 5.5  5.3  10.8    St.  Vincent & Grenadines  23.0  7.0  30.0 
Ghana 0.3  0.8  1.1    Swaziland  0.1  29.2  29.3 
Grenada  21.9 4.5  26.4    Taiwan  0.3 4.4  4.7 
Guatemala 13.7  20.0  33.7    Tanzania  11.9  2.1  14.0 
Guinea-Bissau  0.0 0.1  0.1    Thailand  0.1 1.4  1.5 
Guyana 38.9  14.5  53.4    Togo  2.0  0.2  2.2 
Honduras  18.0  2.0  20.1    Trinidad and Tobago  1.7  6.4  8.1 
Iceland  16.0 3.4  19.4    Tunisia  12.7 0.9  13.6 
India 0.2  39.9  40.1    Turkey  36.3  2.9  39.2 
Indonesia 4.8  21.6  26.4    Uganda  5.6  0.4  6.1 
Israel 20.0  8.4  28.3    United  States  4.9  21.4  26.2 
Jamaica  12.9 12.0  25.0    Uruguay  42.6 12.1  54.8 
Japan  0.1 41.1  41.2    Venezuela,  RB  19.9 36.1  56.0 
Jordan 23.8  1.1  24.9    Zimbabwe  39.7  19.8  59.5 
Korea, Rep.  6.2  2.5  8.7           
Kyrgyz Republic  52.2  0.0  52.2            
 
Our estimates of the share of useless water, deeper water and smoke in total water 
are reported in Table 2. They suggest that around 28 percent of world’s tariff water is 
smoke, and therefore does not represent truly available policy space. Around 75 percent 
of this is due to useless water (bounds above their prohibitive levels), and the remaining 
25 percent due to deeper water (the presence of preferential trade). The prominence of 
useless water is particularly noticeable among low income and high income countries 
where it represents close to 90 percent of smoke. Deeper water represents more than 60 
percent of smoke in middle income countries. 
There are also some interesting differences across sectors. Around 67 percent of 
agriculture’s tariff water is smoke, but only 18 percent in manufacturing. This suggests 
that there are some economic limits to the protectionist response in agriculture. There are 
also striking differences across countries. Smoke represents less than 5 percent of tariff 
water in Benin, Botswana, China, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Macedonia, Chad, Thailand and 
Uganda, but it is more than 50 percent of tariff water in Australia, Chile, the European 
Union, Cambodia, Mexico, Namibia, Norway, Venezuela and Zimbabwe. 
In any case, the economic irrelevance of tariff water due to the presence of smoke 
does not constraint in an economic significant way the protectionist response allowed by 
GATT’s bindings. On average the remaining policy space still represents 62 percent of 
tariff water. And given that tariff water is about twice the existing levels of MFN 
protection, there is enough policy space left to more than double MFN protection.  
 
3. Assessing the protectionist response in previous crisis 
One important step on our way to assessing the protectionist response during the current 
crisis, is to look back and measure the protectionist response in previous crises (see also 
Eichengreen and Irwin, 2009). We concentrate ourselves on the recent past, with an a 
priori that the creation of the WTO at the end of the Uruguay Round may have changed 
the scope for protectionist responses for member countries.
8 
Thus, our sample spans from 1995 to 2008 and it includes all countries reported in 
Tables 1 and 2. We identify economic crisis as an annual decline in real GDP. During the 
                                                 
8
 One could test this hypothesis using earlier data, but tariff line data is only available for a few countries 
before 1995. 10 
 
period we have on average 18 countries that suffer an economic crisis every year (this 
corresponds also to 18 percent of the countries in our sample). In the mid 2000s the 
number of economic crisis every year dropped to 5. It increased to 12 in 2008, and 
according to the Economist Intelligent Units predictions it will affect 71 countries of our 
sample in 2009. The worst year between 1995 and 2008 in terms of economic crisis is 
1999, where 36 countries out of 97 suffered an economic crisis.  
The equation to be estimated is given by: 
 
ict ct 1 t ic ict Crisis ) t ln(              ( 6 )  
 
where  1  is the impact of the crisis on log of MFN tariffs. With this semi-log 
specification,  1 e
1 
  is the percentage change in MFN tariffs during an economic crisis. 
We also try different specifications where we control for the size of the country (GDP), 
as well as the share of neighbors that are in an economic crisis according to our 
definition. Our preferred specification also includes an interaction between crisis on the 
one hand and economic size and the share of neighbors in an economic crisis to try to 
capture any potential heterogeneity. It is given by: 
 
ict ct ct 5 ct ct 4
ct 3 ct 2 ct 1 t ic ict
Crisis Neigh ln Crisis ) GDP ln(
) GDP ln( Neigh Crisis ) t ln(
       
         
    ( 7 )  
 
where Neigb is the share in GDP of the 10 closest neighbors of country c that had a crisis 
in year t.
9  
                                                 
9
Other sources of heterogeneity are also possible. For example Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) suggest that 
countries with a fixed exchange rate regime (and perfect capital mobility) are more likely to resort to a 
protectionist response during an economic crisis. The severity of the crisis may also matter. And therefore 




Table 3: Protectionist responses during economic crisis 




















Crisis  .0195 .022 -.114 -.089 .020 0.013 .016 -.111 -.111 -.082 
  (.001)a (.001)a (.010)a (.011)a (.001)a  (0.003)a (0.06)  (.011)a (.011)a (.011)a 
            
LGDP    -.060 -.059 -.059        -.059 -.059 -.059 
    (.001)a (.001)a (.001)a        (.001)a (.001)a (.001)a 
            
LGDP*Crisis     .006  .005      .006  .006  .005 
     (.001)a  (.001)a      (.001)a  (.001)a  (.001)a 
            
Neigh    -.060    .058        -.059 
    (.001)a    (.001)a        (.001)a 
            
Neigh*crisis      .001        .001 
      (.004)        (.004) 
            
Lag  Crisis       -.0245       
       (.001)a       
            
I n t e r m e * C r i s i s           - . 0 0 6     - . 0 0 6  
          (.002)a    (.002)b 
             
Water*Crisis            -.002  -.002 
            (.001)  (.001) 
Observations  3455453 3455453 3455453 3455453 3455500 3455453  770  3455453 3455453 3455453 
Adjusted R
2  0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.873 0.858 0.873 0.873 0.873 
Standard errors are in parenthesis and are corrected for clustering across products and countries.  a for p < 0.01, b for p < 0.05 and c stands for p < 0.10. All 
regressions include countryxproduct fixed effects, as well as year dummies.  
  
 
Results are reported in Table 3. The first column suggests that an economic crisis 
increases MFN tariffs on average by 2.0 percent. After controlling for the size of the 
country (large countries tend to have smaller tariffs), and the share of neighbors that are 
also in an economic crisis in the second column, the coefficient on crisis increases to 2.2 
percent. In the third column we introduce the interaction term between crisis and size, 
and obtain a positive coefficient on the interaction term, signaling that large countries are 
more likely to increase their tariffs than small countries.
10 Note that the coefficient on 
crisis becomes negative, but the full derivative with respect to crisis that takes into 
account the interaction term is never negative and oscillates between 0 and 7 percent in 
the sample. It is equal to 3.2 percent at the mean of the sample. 
Finally, in the fourth column we report the results of our preferred specification 
corresponding to equation (7) above. The coefficient on crisis is negative, but again after 
taking into account the interaction term with log of GDP, we have that the derivative of 
MFN tariffs with respect to crisis is always positive. At the mean of the sample the 
increase in MFN tariffs is 3.1 percent, and for the country with the largest GDP the 
increase is equal to 6.1 percent, and 0.6 percent for the smallest country. An additional 
interesting result is that if all 10 neighboring countries also get into an economic crisis 
(Share_Neighb=1), then the MFN tariff increases on average by 5.8 percent. The 
interaction between the share of neighbors in a crisis and the country itself having a crisis 
is quantitatively very small and is not statistically different from zero.  
We also perform some robustness checks. Our results so far suggest that since 
1995 up to 2008 increases in MFN tariffs during economic crisis have been modest, 
especially in small countries. The fifth column checks whether they have also been long 
lived, by introducing a lagged crisis variable. We obtain again that countries increase 
their tariff on average by 2 percent during the economic crisis, but that one year later this 
is reversed. This regression (column 5) also implicitly addresses the potential problem of 
endogeneity or reverse causality. Indeed, tariffs are not always higher in countries that 
are more subject to crisis, but they seem to rise in the year of the crisis, and decline one 
year later. 
                                                 
10
 This may be due to the fact that small countries are more likely to be under a strict structural adjustment 
program, and this is something that could be tested.  13 
 
In column (6) we use an alternative definition of crisis to check for the robustness 
of the results. One may argue that in deep crisis protectionism responses will be stronger. 
Thus, in column (6) crisis is defined as a fall in real GDP of more than 3 percent. The 
results suggest again an increase in protectionism. Perhaps surprisingly the protectionism 
increase during strong recessions is smaller than in the presence of shallow recessions 
(although they are not statistically different from each other). Maybe countries in deep 
recessions are more likely to take the opportunity to engage in deeper institutional and 
policy reforms that will prevent large increases in protectionism. 
Columns (7) reports results using group averages, and weighted least squares, 
where weights are given by group size. Indeed, given that crisis does not vary across 
products, the error can be correlated across HS6 digit lines within a country every year. 
Our previous standard error estimates are all corrected non-parametrically for the 
correlation in the error term within groups, and we have a sufficiently large number of 
clusters to ensure the asymptotic properties of this correction. Nevertheless we provide 
weighted least squares estimates using group averages as a robustness check. Column (7) 
provides results for the specification in column (1).  The estimated increase in tariff is not 
statistically different from the one estimated in column (1), but it is not statistically 
different from zero either, suggesting that the increase can potentially be much lower than 
suggested in our previous estimates where we may have underestimated the variance of 
these estimates.  
We explore two additional sources of response heterogeneity.
11 First in a world 
where a growing share of trade is undertaken in intermediate goods, one may expect the 
protectionist response to be smaller in intermediate goods. This is checked in column (9) 
where we introduced the interaction between crisis and a dummy that takes the value 1 
when the good is not a final consumption good (this dummy does not enter the regression 
by itself because it is perfectly collinear with our country*product fixed effects). The 
interaction term is negative and statistically significant as expected. 
                                                 
11
 We are grateful to Bernard Hoekman and Hakan Nordstrom for suggesting us these additional checks. 14 
 
 
Table 4: Predicting MFN tariff changes in 2009 






























MFN (%)   
All countries  0.05  -2.5  52.6  8.0    Macedonia, FYR  0.06  1.0  69.0  5.5 
High  Income  0.04  -4.3 64.7 8.3    Madagascar  0.11 4.2  1.9 1.7 
Middle  Income  0.08 1.7 25.4 5.8    Malawi  0.33 8.2  1.8 1.3 
Low  Income 0.09 2.6  2.9 3.5    Malaysia  0.04  -3.0  0.0 3.1 
                 Mauritius  0.03  2.2  2.0  1.8 
Argentina  0.08 -2.8  82.0  8.5    Mexico  0.13 -2.6  67.8  7.9 
Australia  0.03  -1.2  100.0 9.7    Morocco  0.19 2.3  71.9 6.9 
Bahrain  0.05 2.4 22.5 3.3    Mozambique  0.08 4.8  81.6 6.6 
Bangladesh 0.12 5.5  0.0 2.8    Myanmar  0.06 0.3  52.3 8.1 
Belize  0.08 1.5 91.2 6.3    Namibia  0.09 0.8  81.9 6.4 
Benin  0.16 2.2  1.2 1.4    New  Zealand 0.02  -3.2  97.9 8.5 
Bolivia  0.08 1.4 87.2 7.1    Nicaragua  0.07 1.2  91.6 7.0 
Botswana  0.11 0.2 84.8 6.8    Niger  0.07 2.7  2.0 1.3 
Brazil  0.11  -1.5 63.3 7.7    Nigeria  0.08 2.7  1.6 2.9 
Cambodia  0.09 -3.0  0.0  1.7    Norway  0.01 -1.2  79.2  8.0 
Canada  0.03  -2.2 99.2 9.9    Oman  0.05 2.5  0.0 2.3 
Chad  0.14  -1.0  0.0 1.3    Pakistan  0.11 1.0  0.0 3.0 
Chile  0.06 0.4 92.7 8.5    Panama  0.07  -1.3  88.0 7.3 
China  0.05  6.0  0.0  4.5    Papua N. Guinea  0.01  -0.5  100.0  7.4 
Colombia  0.14 -3.0  65.3  6.9    Paraguay  0.06 -3.1  84.3  6.8 
Costa  Rica  0.05  -0.8 69.2 6.4    Peru  0.04 3.0  73.9 7.2 
Cote  d'Ivoire 0.11 3.0  1.1 2.0    Philippines  0.05  -0.6  0.0 3.0 
Croatia 0.05  -1.8  82.7  7.2    Qatar  0.05  10.8  23.0  4.4 
Ecuador  0.10  -3.5 71.4 6.5    Rwanda  0.16 5.5  7.8 1.7 
El Salvador  0.07  1.0  92.6  7.6    Saudi  Arabia  0.04 0.4  26.1 5.0 
EU  0.05  -3.8 76.0 8.3    Senegal  0.10 3.5  1.0 1.7 
Gabon  0.15 2.8  1.2 1.7    Singapore  0.00  -7.5  0.0 3.1 
Georgia  0.01 0.5 46.9 4.4    South  Africa  0.07  -1.6  2.1 3.4 
Ghana  0.10 5.2  1.0 1.8    Sri  Lanka  0.09 2.6  0.0 2.3 
Guatemala  0.07 1.2 93.6 7.8    Swaziland  0.09 0.3  81.4 5.8 
Guyana  0.12 1.8 75.5 5.2    Taiwan  0.06  -9.3  0.0 5.4 
Honduras  0.08  -0.3 91.1 7.3    Tanzania  0.11 4.5  2.2 2.2 
Iceland 0.02  -12.4  99.2  7.8    Thailand 0.07  -4.4  0.0  3.3 
India  0.10 5.0  0.0 4.0    Togo  0.14 3.0  1.0 1.1 
Indonesia  0.06  -1.3  0.0 3.4    Trinidad  Tobago  0.23 0.9  88.3 7.3 
Israel  0.04 0.1 51.6 6.2    Tunisia  0.20 2.4  73.4 6.7 
Jamaica  0.08 -3.8  78.1  6.5    Turkey  0.06 -2.0  59.8  7.2 
Japan  0.02  -6.4  0.0 4.9    Uganda  0.10 4.0  9.5 2.4 
Jordan 0.09  3.5  46.0  4.7    United  States  0.03  -3.1  95.4  10.9 
Korea, Rep.  0.08  -10.1  0.0  3.9    Uruguay  0.07  -0.2  84.2  7.3 
Kyrgyz  Rep. 0.04 1.0  0.0 1.1    Zimbabwe  0.10  -4.7  0.0 1.6 
Lesotho 0.15  0.40  81.1  5.6             
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Second, one may expect that the protectionist response depends on how much 
policy space is available, so we also introduce an interaction term between crisis and 
tariff water after correcting for smoke in column 9. The coefficient is small, negative and 
statistically insignificant, so policy space does not seem to be the constraint on countries 
protectionist response. (Policy space does not enter the regression by itself because we 
only have it available for 2008 tariffs, and therefore it is perfectly correlated with the 
country*product fixed effects.) The last column introduces all these interaction terms 
together. 
 
4. Estimating the 2009 protectionist response: fire in the sky?  
We use the estimates reported in the fourth column of Table 3 to predict the percentage 
increases in MFN tariffs by country during the year 2009. GDP growth estimates are 
from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Results are reported in Table 4. On average the 
economic crisis results in an increase in MFN tariffs of 8 percent. The smallest increase 
will occur in the Kyrgyz Republic and Togo with a moderate 1.1 percent increase in 
MFN tariffs. Note that of the ten countries with the lowest increase in protectionism, nine 
are located in SSA. The low increase in protectionism is partly explained by their small 
economic size, and also the fact that a small share of their neighbors is predicted to be in 
an economic crisis.  
  At the other end of the scale, we predict an increase in MFN tariff of around 10 
percent in the United States, Canada and Australia. Note however, that these are countries 
with very low MFN tariffs so the 10 percent increase will only lead to a moderate 
increase in absolute levels of protectionism. Moreover, for those countries water appears 
only in a limited number of tariff lines. The predicted increase in MFN tariffs is 8.3 
percent in the European Union. Figure 2 plots the predicted percentage change in MFN 
tariffs against the log of GDP per capita.   16 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
The amount of policy space left by WTO legal tariff bindings allows for an increase in 
MFN tariffs similar to what we observed during the great depression and this after 
controlling for the smoke in the tariff water, i.e., bindings above prohibitive levels and 
widespread regional trade agreements.  
However, when looking at recent economic crisis, it seems that this large policy 
space has been rarely used by countries facing economic crisis. Large countries tend to 
increase their tariffs more than small countries when facing a crisis, and even more when 
the crisis also affects neighboring countries. Increases in intermediate goods’ tariffs tend 
to be smaller than increases in final goods tariffs as one would expect in a world with a 
growing share of trade in intermediate goods. Also tariff increases do not seem to be 
constrained by the available policy space. Nevertheless, the overall increase in MFN 
tariffs remains modest.  17 
 
Using these estimates for the period 1995-2008, we then predict the increases in 
MFN tariffs to be observed in 2009 depending on whether the country faces an economic 
crisis and the share of neighbors predicted to have an economic crisis. MFN tariff hikes 
oscillate between 1 and 10 percent, with the largest percentage increases in countries with 
relatively low levels of MFN tariffs in 2008. 
Obviously, MFN tariffs are only one of many instruments in the protectionist 
toolbox. Baldwin and Evenett (2009) warned us of the increase in the use of murkier 
forms of protectionism like during the great depression, and a similar study on the 
evolution of other forms of protectionism is needed. This will help us understand why 
countries are not using the policy space available during economic crisis. If it is the 
simple recognition that protectionism may not be the right response and that it can 
exacerbate the problem it is trying to correct, then we shouldn’t be observing increases in 
murkier forms of protectionism. However, if the reason has to do with country reputation 
and fear of signaling beggar-thy-neighbor behavior to other countries, then increases in 
murkier and less transparent forms of protectionism are consistent with smallest increases 
in MFN tariffs. Hopefully the first explanation is the correct one. But if murkier and less 
transparent forms of protectionism are spreading, then an adequate response by the 
international community would be to bring more transparency to the system. 
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All data on MFN, PTA and bound tariffs as well as import values are from the World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) based on the Trade Analysis and Information System 
(TRAINS). European Union data is only for extra-EU trade. The data on past GDP come 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The 2009 forecasts of the GDP 
indicators are made by the Economist Intelligence Unit in their Country Analysis and 
Forecast section. The data on geodistances come from the CEPII research center.  
The cross-section contains MFN and bound tariffs, at HS-6 level, import values and GDP 
per capita for 97(TBC) countries as well as for five regional aggregates, three income 
level aggregates and an overall average of all countries. For all except GDP per capita, 
the data is from the latest available year in TRAINS, while for the GDP per capita the 
year 2005 was used because it contained the least missing values. 
The time series data set runs from 1995 to 2008 and counts with yearly MFN and 
bound tariff at HS-6 level with each country as reporter and the world as partner plus real 
GDP measures. Bilateral distance is used to identify the closest neighbors of each 
country.  
Products under Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) are those where the 
difference between the MFN tariff and effectively applied tariff is larger than 0.1 percent 
(to account for any rounding error). In this way each tariff line is labeled as having a 
PTA or not, the trade values are then aggregated for each country separately according to 
lines that are PTA and lines that are not under PTA.  
When the bound tariff is smaller than the MFN, the bound was replaced by the 
MFN (17999 cases out of 477083 observations). In the case of an unbounded tariff line, 
the bound tariff is calculated by using the prohibitive tariff.   In the data used in section 
2, this occurred in 101761 tariff lines out of 477083 observations.  
The crisis dummy capture a negative GDP growth (as recorded in the WDI) thus 
implying a year-to-year decline in GDP (in real terms). The variable capturing crisis in 
neighboring countries is calculated as the share of crisis dummies in the closest 10 
neighboring countries weighed by their GDP. (The partner's GDP are used to weigh both 20 
 
their distances from the country in order to rank the closest neighbors taking account of 
















Water Water  Water Water 
All  countries  70.5 0.26  21.3 0.09    Kyrgyz  Republic  60.0 0.07  48.8 0.03 
High  Income  75.7 0.24  7.8 0.05    Lesotho  46.7 1.93  7.2 0.46 
Middle  Income  62.3 0.23  33.2 0.16    Macedonia,  FYR  16.2 0.00  1.4 0.00 
Low  Income    52.1 0.72  27.1 0.33    Madagascar  19.9 0.34  11.8 0.51 
                 Malawi  56.2  0.88  41.0  1.12 
Antigua  &  Barbuda  26.4 0.96  17.7 0.43    Malaysia  75.8 0.61  20.5 0.14 
Argentina  83.3 0.24  42.1 0.28    Mali  17.2 0.44  5.8 0.35 
Australia  62.0 0.05  60.7 0.07    Mauritania  67.3 0.46  2.7 0.17 
Bahrain  33.3 0.36  7.9 0.64    Mauritius  29.8 0.92  8.7 0.79 
Bangladesh  57.7 1.85  17.2 0.68    Mexico  91.1 0.26  65.7 0.25 
Barbados  28.5 0.74  31.3 0.78    Mongolia  1.6 0.13  0.1 0.14 
Belize  5.6 0.89  41.9 0.49    Morocco  36.3 0.47  53.1 0.21 
Benin  7.0 0.47  5.1 0.39    Mozambique  64.0 0.87  9.0 0.56 
Bolivia  86.7 0.30  46.4 0.37    Myanmar  90.0 1.60  9.9 0.42 
Botswana  33.8 0.24  10.5 0.12    Namibia  85.7 0.41  40.9 0.21 
Brazil  86.8 0.31  40.8 0.19    Nepal  16.2 0.32  9.8 0.12 
Brunei  19.2 0.37  32.1 0.32    New  Zealand  72.2 0.05  49.2 0.09 
Burkina  Faso  24.0 0.78  4.6 0.47    Nicaragua  58.1 0.40  10.5 0.36 
Burundi  62.4 0.75  48.2 0.93    Niger  48.7 0.83  9.5 0.38 
Cambodia  68.9 0.30  30.7 0.06    Nigeria  34.7 1.13  5.1 0.63 
Cameroon  14.0 0.71  4.8 0.98    Norway  84.4 0.66  3.9 0.02 
Canada  52.8 0.07  19.0 0.06    Oman  33.8 0.11  33.1 0.08 
Central  African  Rep.  1.6 0.12  1.3 0.35    Pakistan  56.9 1.04  35.3 0.47 
Chad  13.2 0.60  0.2 1.01    Panama  18.1 0.09  34.0 0.14 
Chile  91.4 0.23  60.4 0.24    Papua  N.  Guinea  7.5 0.26  5.1 0.31 
China  18.5 0.00  4.8 0.00    Paraguay  89.8 0.17  33.4 0.33 
Colombia  67.2 1.01  30.4 0.29    Peru  73.3 0.35  35.5 0.31 
Costa  Rica  31.0 0.23  19.2 0.36    Philippines  25.2 0.40  15.7 0.44 
Cote  d'Ivoire  16.1 0.14  0.8 0.47    Qatar  37.7 0.16  22.9 0.12 
Croatia  25.8 0.03  24.2 0.01    Rwanda  39.3 0.40  43.3 0.80 
Cuba  38.3 0.23  10.4 0.37    Saudi  Arabia  12.7 0.11  12.7 0.05 
Dominica  41.7 1.01  40.5 0.52    Senegal  3.4 0.16  17.2 0.20 
Ecuador  40.1 0.16  19.6 0.15    Singapore  75.0 1.05  0.0 0.64 
El  Salvador  45.6 0.29  28.0 0.29    South  Africa  46.2 0.36  19.7 0.23 
European  Union  65.6 0.23  24.8 0.01    Sri  Lanka  13.4 0.30  15.5 0.63 
Gabon  14.6  0.38  1.6  0.04    St. Kitts and Nevis  24.5  0.87  15.9  0.61 
Georgia  31.4 0.08  5.6 0.07    St.  Lucia  40.6 1.03  51.1 0.71 
Ghana  8.0  0.76  0.2  0.92    St. Vincent & Grenadines  36.2  1.04  26.3  0.53 
Grenada  35.1 0.70  22.4 0.40    Swaziland  17.6 0.34  31.0 0.22 
Guatemala  46.1 0.57  31.3 0.35    Taiwan  39.5 0.02  0.2 0.01 
Guinea  0.3 0.30  0.0 0.40    Tanzania  30.7 0.91  12.0 0.87 
Guyana  55.7 0.71  52.4 0.42    Thailand  14.6 0.34  0.9 0.47 
Honduras  33.0 0.17  17.6 0.15    Togo  13.3 0.66  1.7 0.93 
Iceland  28.3 0.31  18.5 0.23    Trinidad  Tobago  13.7 0.62  7.2 0.36 
India  73.4 0.68  38.0 0.26    Tunisia  17.2 0.44  13.3 0.49 
Indonesia  42.0 0.43  24.5 0.27    Turkey  44.2 0.22  38.9 0.45 
Israel  48.0 0.65  23.8 0.29    Uganda  18.3 0.57  5.3 0.96 
Jamaica  26.1 0.74  24.6 0.41    United  States  43.5 0.01  6.0 0.00 
Japan  88.4 0.70  0.1 0.11    Uruguay  86.3 0.25  51.6 0.29 
Jordan  17.4 0.05  26.2 0.05    Venezuela  65.2 0.46  53.9 0.20 
Korea,  Rep.  40.1 0.15  6.9 0.21    Zimbabwe  85.6 1.20  48.3 0.42 22 
 
 